Between 1990 and 2001, Vietnamese opium production declined by 98%: the causes of this reduction have received minimal academic attention. As Viet Nam is one of only a handful of states which have successfully suppressed illicit opium production, the somewhat surprising lack of scholarly attention represents an underutilised opportunity. As such, this paper represents the first step towards rectifying this gap in the knowledge base. The available evidence suggests that a number of components converged to permit suppression: (1) The state possessed authority over the majority of its territory; (2) The state placed opium farmers under extensive surveillance; (3) The state possessed leverage (rural development and law enforcement) in negotiations for 'voluntary' eradication; (4) The elite perceived suppression as in their best interest. Additionally, while the state pledged support to develop alternative livelihoods, few farmers received state assistance. This would suggest that disentives, rather than the establishment of alternative incomes, were the primary motivation for the cessation of opium production. While Viet Nam was successful in suppressing illicit opium production, the negative impact of the intervention on (ex)-opium farmers and their communities demonstrate the limitation of the Vietnamese approach.
Introduction
Viet Nam is one of a small number of countries to administer interventions which have 'successfully' removed the illicit production of opium from their national territory. 1 Between 1990 and 2001, Vietnamese opium production declined by 98% from a peak of 90 metric tonnes to two metric tonnes. It is therefore surprising that a unique opportunity to improve our understanding of the processes by which large-scale opium production can be suppressed . ' The Suppression of Illicit Opium Production in Viet Nam: An Introductory Narrative'. Crime, Law and Social Change, 57(4), pp. 425-439. Pre-print copy.
[19, 20] outside of Vietminh authority [17, 42] . This said, John McAlister suggests that the Vietminh facilitated opium production which they exchanged for weapons in southern China [42] . Furthermore, Laos continued to be the more significant producer [18] and in 1953 the Vietminh invaded the four largest Laotian opium producing provinces: which together accounted for 70% of Indochinese production [39] . That the occupation persisted just long enough to harvest opium [82] 3 demonstrates not only the importance of opium but may also suggest that North Viet Nam possessed insufficient opium for either profit or medicine.
1954-1990s
In the late-1960s/early-1970s around 500,000 American troops were stationed in Viet Nam to support the South Vietnamese Government against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese included the equally introverted Laos in their analyses. In short, the true extent of illicit opium production is unknown. What is clear, however, is that by the 1990s production was sufficiently high to concern the Vietnamese Government.
The intervention
During the early-1990s, the Vietnamese Government attitude to narcotics began to shift to a position where prohibition was perceived as in their best interest. The Government had become concerned over increasing opiate consumption [54] : the prevalence rate of drug 'addicts' per 100,000 increased from 78 to 208 between 1994 and 2004 and, importantly, opiate consumption was no longer contained to highland ethnic groups [50] . Furthermore, the Government began to see the utility in international cooperation [49] , at a time when they were seeking to promote a market economy in the highland areas [54] and improve the countries international image. 5 In response, production and consumption were prohibited under Article 61 of the 1992 Constitution. This was followed, in 1993, with Decree 06/CP which set the provisions for eradication and development-orientated drug control [10, 80] . Sources: adapted from [72, 75] . Note: missing values indicates missing data.
Development-orientated approaches to control

Intervention
The Government of Viet Nam have, since the early-1990s, remained committed to removing illicit production from the Vietnamese territory. While political will may be a prominent feature of national success (in reducing opium production) [70, 76] , Ami-Jacques Rapin and colleagues [55] posit the centrality of 'negotiated' eradication, extensive surveillance and the inclusion of conditionality clauses in non-opium rural development projects.
Viet Nam had reduced production from 61 metric tonnes to 15 metric tonnes by the time that Ky Son was initiated or that drug control was mainstreamed into national rural development policies. This would suggest that rural development, be it alternative development or crop substitution, was insufficient motivation for the cessation of opium 1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 Sources: adapted from: [69, 72, 75] .
Concluding remarks
This paper has provided an introductory narrative on how Viet Nam became a major source of illicit opium and how it eventually suppressed illicit production. Some causal factors for (drug control) success have been extracted. These factors go some way to explaining the processes by which a major producer can suppress illicit opium production.
